Federal conference takeaways
Network Defenders MUST Understand What They Defend
I know, this is common sense, right? Wrong. Enterprise networks continue to grow cruft; very rarely will they stagnate. Often times networks are set up by one group of people, all of whom are long gone by the time you show up to do your job and leave behind no documentation (feeling that gut churn yet?). What do you do then?
Your job. It is up to you, as the network defender, to understand what the network you’re protecting is used for. If there’s nobody around to tell you where everything is, then you have to go to management and present the situation and ask for authorization to perform your own mapping.
Understand the Mission
Think of your organization as if it were the military (for some, this may not be much of a stretch): What is the mission your network supports? What falls within and without the bounds of this mission? These are questions that you should be ready and able to answer. If you cannot, then you must speak with your management about determining who can.
Nmap would be an obvious starting point here, but sometimes you’ll run into management who thinks that Nmap is synonymous with outages and lost productivity. Regardless of the tool you use, you have to map out what physical devices exist on your network. Every device capable of obtaining an IP address and even devices that normally don’t but are connected to the network via a device that does - think serial hub with an IP management port.
Another challenge associated with logical mapping is storing the information you gather. How do you diagram it once you’ve collected it? This is a question I’m constantly investigating as a very kludgy Visio diagram is not the answer for everybody.
It is debatable in which order you map, but I think it makes sense to get an idea of what devices are communicating on your network before determining where they are physically. This is a crucial step, as you must understand what physical security controls are in place to ensure the safety of assets on your network. Are USB drive prohibited via group policy? Savvy users can get around that if the USB ports on their workstations aren’t locked or removed. What good is all of the perimeter protection if your adversary can steal what they’re after from the building it’s in - or pay/convince someone within your organization to do so for them?
Who uses the network? Who are the administrators on the network? Are the administrators assigned the correct privileges such that they only have elevated privilege for the applications they use and default privileges elsewhere? Are there any legacy users whose accounts may not have been deactivated and still exist? Questions like these are important to answer so that you have a concrete idea of who the users are on the network. If Alice is your Exchange admin but you notice that her account has admin privileges on Bob’s IIS server, that should call your attention. If Bob hasn’t worked for your organization for six months, but his account hasn’t been deactivated and you notice successful authentication attempts periodically, that should worry you even if it doesn’t worry anyone else.
The sobering point I took away from this recent conference is that attackers always win and defenders always lose - the difference between a good defender and a bad defender is how badly they lose.
The Human Element
Enterprise tools are a wholly different set from many of the tools the individual computer network defender relies upon. They can be multi-million dollar tools that require teams of people and scads of hardware to support. Often, these tools will have a marketable feature that automates certain tasks and produces the results in an easy-to-read report.
Sounds obvious, right?
I would think so, too, but often a manager will listen to a sales pitch or read something and get it into her head that the latest widget from Sophokaspermcafymantec will fulfill their every need. Management will think all they have to do is pay several million dollars for the software license and support contract, get the company representatives out to install the beast, then sit back, light a cigar, and bask as their enterprise sits impenetrable behind a mountain of automatically-generated .pdfs and automated e-mail notifications. Ahh, the good life!
In reality, it takes educated and intuitive individuals to parse this output and paint a picture of what it says about the enterprise as a whole. There must be a link between the tools and management that can properly interpret the results. Sure, tools can parse the content of IDS logs many orders of magnitude more quickly than a human can, but can they make a meaningful inference about any of that resulting content? It will take a knowledgeable individual to interpret this output, compare it with the original, and make an informed decision about the relevance and importance of it.
To tie this in with my previous takeaway; it takes knowledge about the network, about the mission as a whole, to turn the data spat out by the enterprise tools into useful information that can be taken to management. This information must be briefly summarized so it “sinks in” and management can make a decision what to do with it.
The Human Element cannot be dismissed and must be constantly evolving to meet the needs of the organization it supports.
Also, a little job security doesn’t hurt!
Collaboration is Essential
By now, you might be thinking that these takeaways are common sense and are so trivial that you shouldn’t be wasting your time reading them. I think so, too, but this information is critical and bears repeating.
To effectively protect your organization’s information and information networks, collaboration between teams and team members is absolutely critical. Perhaps you work in the government space or perhaps the private. Perhaps the role of safeguarding information falls to one team, or perhaps many teams - perhaps you’re the only person on the team! Barring that last scenario, the role of each team member and each team should be clearly defined (see Takeaway #1) and there must be clear communication paths between the two. Every organization, whether Federal or private, has to deal with politicking and bickering between different chains of command. If you work in an environment where this is minimal or has a minimal impact on the nature of the business, consider yourself extremely lucky.
I have seen essential initiatives delayed by months, even more than a year in one case, due to politicking and posturing between two individuals in a managerial position who did not see eye-to-eye. Collaboration is essential not only because it fosters goodwill between team members, but being coordinated in your efforts raises the cost to your adversaries. Provide a stronger line of defense and a more united front to your adversaries: if you recognize that the teams responsible for InfoSec in your organization aren’t getting the job done, speak up!